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“God has many gifts which He lavishes upon his creatures: among them 
is the gift of scholarship . . .”1 and “[t]o every gift [including the gift of 
scholarship] attaches an obligation.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have filled books, treatises, magazines, journals and law 
reviews with various writings ranging from highly intricate and complex theses 
to oversimplified and homogenous explanations.  In all its forms, legal 
scholarship has been both touted and taunted by external and internal critics 
throughout the years.3  Some suggest that legal scholarship should holistically 
 
* Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical 
University (“FAMU”), College of Law; J.D.: Florida State University College of Law, Cum Laude 
1994; B.S.: University of Florida, 1991.   
1. David Lefkowitz, The Obligations of Scholarship, 5 PHI BETA KAPPA KEY 502, 503 (1924).   
2. Id. at 502.   
3. See, e.g., Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the 
U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 717 (2012) (tracing the contours of the 
conflict over the construction of the role(s), or persona(e), of the U.S. law professor, Professor Pedrioli 
summarizes some of the conflicting views regarding the purpose of legal scholarship); see also Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 192 (2002) (contrasting the purposes of legal 
scholarship, as articulated by Goldsmith, Vermeule, and others, with that of empirical research, which 
aims to “learn about the world” (quoting Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 9 n.23 (2002))); Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 6, 8 (2016) (summarizing the criticisms from both inside legal academia and the outside 
bar as follows: “[A]ccording to one of these various camps of either internal or external critics, much 
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“frame recommendations to responsible decision makers,” and more 
specifically “help the reader understand law.”4  Others suggest that it should be 
used to bring “restraint, proportion, perspective and atmosphere” into the legal 
landscape and society at large.5  Whatever its stated purpose and whether it be 
doctrinal, descriptive or practical, legal scholarship remains an intricate and 
influential factor in legal academia, the legal system as a whole, and shaping 
cultural and professional discourses.  As such, the varied and broad topics of 
 
of what we call ‘legal scholarship’ may be scholarship but it’s not ‘law’—it is too academic, too 
disciplined, too theoretic, and too detached, of no use to the profession and therefore of no value; or, 
according to another camp, much of what we call legal scholarship may be ‘legal’ but it’s not true 
scholarship—it’s nothing but legal writing in disguise, elaborated memoranda for courts, legislators, 
or regulators, but it’s not scholarship.  Legal scholarship, in short, is on the horns of a ‘normativity’ 
dilemma.  To some critics, legal scholarship isn’t scholarship, because it’s too normative, while to 
another camp, it may be scholarship, but it isn’t legal because it’s not normative enough.  For every 
critique, both inside and outside the academy, one can find its opposite, also forcefully voiced.  Legal 
scholarship does not want for critics.”).  Much of the dispute about legal scholarship stems from 
disputes regarding the purpose of such scholarship.  For example, disputes as to whether legal scholars 
write for each other or for legal decisionmakers outside academia?  Whether doctrinal analysis is the 
core of legal scholarship versus whether such scholarship is “too pedestrian and practice-oriented”?  
Whether scholars should engage in “internal” critiques of legal rules, or “external” critiques of legal 
practice (including the practice of scholarship)?  Whether legal scholarship should be prescriptive, or 
mainly descriptive?  This Article will not debate the intricacies of legal scholarship’s purpose per se; 
it posits that despite the objective of legal scholarship, whether it be prescriptive or descriptive, 
analytical or practical; the overarching purpose must include a satisfaction of the social contract 
between the public and the legal profession.  For more in-depth reviews of the purpose of legal 
scholarship, see David Monsma, The Academic Equivalence of Science and Law: Normative Legal 
Scholarship in the Quantitative Domain of Social Science, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 157 (2006); Daniel 
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. 
L. REV. 807, 840–42 (1993); Robert Weisberg, A Symposium On Legal Scholarship, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 521, 521 (1992); Papers from the Yale Journal Symposium on Legal Scholarship: Its Nature and 
Purposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981); David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be 
Fewer Articles Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More For Legal Decision-Makers And 
Less For Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 761, 763 (2005) (joining the debate on the role of legal 
scholarship); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. 
L. REV. 889, 889 (1992) (suggesting that much of the dispute stems from our lack of any theory of 
evaluation); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 75 (1992) (“[T]he growing disarray we now see in the profession is 
directly related to the growing incoherence in law teaching and scholarship.”); Harry T. Edwards, The 
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 2191, 2219 (1993); see also Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1436–37 (1996) (discussing 
why legal scholarship is mainly prescriptive in suggesting that a new synthesis of discourse for legal 
scholarship can be developed by incorporating law, social policy, and social change).   
4. Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 792, 796 (1991); Farber & Sherry, supra note 3, at 809.   
5. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 504.   
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legal scholarship (the empirical, the interpretive, the normative, and the 
prescriptive) provide innumerable opportunities for legal scholars: 
opportunities that are truly a “gift” as noted by Professor Lefkowitz.6  This 
“gift” should not be taken for granted, and “should comport with [both] the 
goals and attributes of the academy”7 and with the goals and conditions of the 
legal profession.   
However, a 2015 empirical study concluded that legal scholarship, “in its 
present form, is a massive and unsupportable investment in what benefits a few 
people in a narrow universe.”8  In fact, research indicates that current legal 
scholarship’s benefit to any groups outside of law professors is “attenuated at 
best.”9  To passively acknowledge this as fact without a conscious effort to 
change the reputation of legal scholarship should be unacceptable to legal 
scholars.  As members of the community of higher education, legal scholars 
must fulfil their basic responsibility of refining, extending, and transmitting 
knowledge.10  This responsibility extends beyond the ears of law students and 
the doors of law schools.  Legal scholars have an obligation not just to 
academia, but to law schools, the greater legal community, and society in 
general to increase the reach and impact of legal scholarship.  This obligation, 
owed to society as a whole,11 requires legitimacy that entails a few basic 
responsibilities such as sincerity, candor, exhaustiveness, and thoroughness.  
This Article will explore the basic tenets of these responsibilities in an effort to 
articulate the legal scholar’s obligations owed under a “social contract” with 
society.  Part II will briefly discuss the scholar’s social contract with society 
which serves as a foundation for the accountability of legal scholarship.  Part 
III will explore the scholar’s obligations of sincerity and candor.  Part IV will 
discuss the obligation and importance of exhaustiveness and thoroughness.  Part 
 
6. Id. at 503.   
7. Farber & Sherry, supra note 3, at 809.  In providing an overview of the legal storytelling 
movement and evaluating its claims, the authors discuss the fundamental purposes of legal scholarship 
and how storytelling can contribute to the same.  Id. at 811.   
8. Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications and the Troubled State of 
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 50 (2015) (identifying fundamental 
problems with legal scholarship such as use of citations).   
9. Id. at 58 (indicating that empirical studies evidence that “[t]he benefits of legal scholarship to 
any constituent group (other than law professors) are, as [the authors’] study demonstrates, attenuated 
at best”).   
10. AALS, STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES BY LAW PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF 
THEIR ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (amended 2017) (1989), 
https://www.aals.org/members/other-member-services/aals-statements/ethics/ [https://perma.cc/8J7S-
BMW9] [hereinafter AALS STATEMENT].   
11. See infra Part II (regarding the social contract).   
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V will offer suggested criteria for legal scholars’ fulfillment of these critical 
obligations.   
II. LEGAL SCHOLARS’ SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH SOCIETY 
In 2014, the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education reported 
that “[s]ociety has a deep interest in the competence of lawyers, in their 
availability to serve society and clients, in the broad public role they can play, 
and in their professional values.”12  This societal concern and investment is a 
crucial factor in the relationship between law and society.  As lawyers, legal 
scholars are an intricate part of the profession whether or not they realize “that 
they are engaged in a common enterprise—the education and professional 
development of the members of a great profession” or view themselves “as 
[being] separated [from practicing lawyers] by a ‘gap.’”13  Beyond the duties of 
teaching students, furthering scholarly pursuits, and ensuring the substantive 
competence of tomorrow’s lawyers, law professors have a broader obligation 
in this “common enterprise”14 to ensure that scholarly contributions “uphold 
and enhance” the professional values and “standards of the legal profession.”15  
As with all lawyers, these contributions are instrumental in the “effective 
functioning of ordered society” and their interplay in society creates what has 
been posited as a “social contract” between lawyers and the general public.16  
The basis for this social contract is the autonomy granted by the public to the 
legal profession wherein the legal profession should foster the core ideals and 
values of the profession and regulate itself via peer review, standards for entry 
into and continued membership in the profession, and standards for “how 
individual professionals perform their work so that it serves the public good in 
 
12. ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 
(2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_
recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ7D-KRN5] [hereinafter 
ABA TASK FORCE, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS].   
13. See ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT–
AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 3 (ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar ed., 1992), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_educati
on_and_professional_development_maccrate_report%29.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ7N-
QKRC].  This report is otherwise known as the “MacCrate Report.”   
14. Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, The “New Normal” for Educating Lawyers, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 53, 
71–72 (2016) (“[L]aw professors have a broader obligation in this ‘common enterprise’ to ensure that 
the attributes and qualities displayed by new lawyers will serve to uphold and enhance the standards 
of the legal profession.”).   
15. Id. at 72.   
16. ABA TASK FORCE, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 12, at 6.   
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the area of the profession’s responsibility.”17  In return, the profession has duties 
to the public to  
maintain high standards of minimum competence and ethical 
conduct to serve the public purpose of the profession and to 
discipline those who fail to meet these standards; to promote 
the core values and ideals of the profession; and to restrain self-
interest to some degree to serve the public purpose of the 
profession.18   
This social contract produces moral responsibilities that should be upheld by 
every legal professional, including legal scholars.19   
Paragraphs 10–12 of the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct emphasize the importance of the legal profession fulfilling its 
obligation under this social contract, with Paragraph 12 stating that “[t]he legal 
profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-
government . . . .  Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the 
independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.”20  
Society trusts that the contract will be honored and it is this public reliance that 
is key to the tenets of the social contract.  Doubt or distrust in the legal 
profession’s ability to uphold its responsibilities could result in potential 
revision of the social contract and threaten a reduction (or elimination) of the 
profession’s autonomy.  It is therefore imperative that the legal profession, 
including legal scholars, fulfill their correlative duties to ensure that the social 
contract is being satisfied.  These duties necessarily require sincerity, candor, 
and thoroughness in production of legal scholarship.   
 
17. Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 4, 4–5.   
18. Id. at 5 (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE 
OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 21 (Jossey-Bass ed., 2nd ed. 2005)).   
19. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 24–25 (Donald A. Cress 
trans., 1987) (1762) (“[The social contract] produces a moral and collective body . . . which receives 
from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will.”); see also Hillary A. Sale, Educating 
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, 49 J. C. STUDENT DEV. 71, 71 (2008) (book review) 
(noting that lawyers operate under this social contract both “in the public sphere and with the public 
trust”).   
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE paras. 10–12 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) 
(emphasis added).   
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III. OBLIGATIONS OF SINCERITY AND CANDOR 
“You can’t have a high standard of scholarship without having a high 
standard of integrity, because the essence of scholarship is truth.”21 
The “desire to find or to say what is true” is commonly acknowledged as 
one purpose of legal scholarship.22  Implicit in this is the goal to create a 
community of academic inquiry that is solidly based on truth.23  In order to 
serve the profession’s public purpose under the social contract, legal scholars 
must therefore have a commitment to truth.  This requires open-mindedness, 
“intellectual honesty,”24 and exercising some “meaningful restraint on self 
interest.”25  Certainly scholars should be aware of their audience, and purpose 
(be it to inform or persuade).26  Even if scholars’ writings are a result of the 
process of thinking things through with a goal of providing arguments, 
suggestions or recommendations; or to publicly “test out and develop one or 
another intellectual project,”27 the scholar must be honest in presenting 
evidence.  The scholar should also be open to “revealing the extent to which he 
has [or has not] conformed to the methodological conventions of the 
discipline.”28  To do otherwise creates a cloud of manipulation and can reek of 
deception or some hidden motive or agenda.  This cloud could undermine the 
integrity of our legal system and the laws it interprets and creates.   
Although judges and other legal scholars have criticized legal scholarship’s 
relevance to the judiciary,29 empirical studies evidence that, in fact, the use of 
 
21. About Us, JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN CTR., https://jhfc.duke.edu/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/N6WP-FZDF] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (quoting Dr. John Hope Franklin). 
22. Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 
95, 124 (1994); see also Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 185, 186 (1994) (“The purpose of legal scholarship is the 
achievement of truth.”).   
23. Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1986) (noting that 
the scholar “must be honest in presenting evidence”).   
24. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § II (“The scholar’s commitment to truth requires 
intellectual honesty and open-mindedness.”).   
25. Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an 
Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470, 494 (2008).   
26. Carol Sanger, Editing, 82 GEO. L.J. 513, 515 (1993) (“Law professors write in law reviews 
in order to inform or persuade a particular public—the bar, legislatures, courts, colleagues—on some 
point of legal doctrine or theory each author thinks is important.”).   
27. Id.   
28. Cramton, supra note 23, at 5.   
29. See, e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 3, at 778 (claiming that the “trend” toward “‘not 
merely unhelpful,’ but ‘useless’” legal scholarship is “already apparent”).   
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legal scholarship by the federal circuit courts of appeals has increased.30  It is 
therefore imperative that scholarship that impacts the law be accurate and 
honest.  Furthermore, the social contract dictates upholding the values of the 
profession including the maintenance of the integrity of the profession.31  This 
necessitates avoidance of any “professional misconduct” such as “dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”32  As an old wise woman once told me, “If 
you are not speaking truth, you are telling a lie or a half-truth: both of which 
are dishonest and insincere.”  The truth hurts sometimes.  However, truth given 
without any malice or negative intent will be received and appreciated.  Legal 
scholarship must therefore be committed to telling “the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth.”   
IV. OBLIGATIONS OF EXHAUSTIVENESS AND THOROUGHNESS 
Implicit in the truthfulness and sincerity of legal scholarship are the 
correlative obligations of exhaustiveness and thoroughness.  In general, legal 
scholarship can involve the process of explaining, expounding or even rejecting 
ideologies of the legal and economic systems; developing/creating something 
new; or reclaiming the old with modifications that provide improvement.  
Critical analysis is crucial regardless of the form or purpose of the scholarship.  
The importance of critical analysis is illustrated through certain aspects of legal 
scholarship that directly impact society such as scholarship on difficult social 
issues.  Scholars necessarily often have to confront difficult issues such as 
inequality and divisions in race, gender, environmental, and economic 
systems.33  The present political and social climate highlight divisions, 
inequalities, and deep rifts in the foundation of our society.34  Laws and policies 
that either support or repair these rifts are often fodder for scholarly debate.  
The contemporary moment with potential dangers of oligarchy and 
authoritarianism highlights the need for critical and analytical scholarship.  In 
order to accomplish this and fulfill the legal scholar’s obligation under the 
social contract necessarily requires exhaustive research and analysis.  There 
must therefore be a commitment to critical legal analysis which includes 
thorough review and engagement with the work of other scholars.  This does 
 
30. David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts 
of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2011) (citing results from an 
empirical study that evidence an increase in the use of legal scholarship citations in federal court of 
appeals decisions).   
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“Misconduct”).   
32. Id. at r. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”).   
33. See West, supra note 3, at 10.   
34. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 14, at 55.   
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not simply envision an exercise in intellectual oeuvre.  Rather, it is an integral 
component of the legal scholar’s responsibility under the social contract.   
Exhaustive and thorough research must necessarily include both the 
individual scholar’s perspective of the subject matter and a collective discourse 
on the topic.  To flesh out the sincerity of an issue requires critical review of 
the body of knowledge and information on that issue.  The lack of bluntly-
criticized scholarship indicates a hesitancy to cause potential denigration or 
disparagement of other scholars’ work.  However, that hesitancy undermines 
the scholarly enterprise by failing to adhere to the tenets of truth, sincerity, and 
candor.  Conversely, legal scholarship can strengthen the scholarly enterprise 
by fairly presenting both sides of an argument to highlight the pros and cons of 
perspectives thereby strengthening the truth of the writings.   
Authors rely on their expertise and experience to fuel the creative process 
of legal scholarship.  The ideas that result from this process create laws and 
legal norms.   It has been argued with some sincerity that  “there are no original 
ideas.”35  “On the other hand, it may be argued that all ideas are original to a 
given individual, regardless of how many times the idea has been proposed by 
others.”36  Either way, to have true scholarly value, the ideas (original or not) 
should  contribute to the “building blocks” that construct the law.37  The social 
contract demands legal scholars’ contribution to these building blocks, and an 
expectancy that there will be some analysis, evaluation, and assessment of 
same.  A necessary component of authorship is inevitable exposure to criticism 
or analysis of one’s work.  The legal profession prides itself on breeding civility 
and professionalism.  If civility is the norm, any criticism of other scholarship 
will not be perceived as an attack or negative censure.  In fact, judgment on the 
merits and faults of scholarship encourage engagement with other scholars.  
Law professors often instruct students who are writing scholarly articles to 
figure out how they can “join” and “contribute” to the scholarly conversation 
on the topic they are researching.  The intellectual discourse is just that: a form 
of conversation.  To be the only person talking in a room full of intellectual 
resources would minimize the scholarly voice into a narcissistic monologue that 
fails to provide any meaningful contribution.  One person speaking is not a 
conversation.  It is not an exchange.  Therefore, in order to meaningfully engage 
with the “conversation” topic of any legal scholarship, “the scholarship of 
 
35. Michael L. Closen & Robert M. Jarvis, The National Conference of Law Reviews Model 
Code of Ethics: Final Text and Comments, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 509, 526 (1992).   
36. Id.   
37. Id. at 525–26 (noting that the law is a “set of building blocks that is constantly being used to 
fashion new ideas”).   
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others is indispensable to one’s own.”38  It is the participation in this intellectual 
exchange that allows legal scholars to test and improve knowledge in a given 
field “to the ultimate benefit of their students, the profession, and society”39 in 
adherence with the social contract.  Where a community of scholars engage in 
“an endless process of discovery, reflection, and dialogue concerning ideas, 
facts, and values carried on in an atmosphere of mutual support and 
understanding,” the “best and most important scholarship emerges.”40   
In addition to reflection and dialogue with other scholars, impactful legal 
scholarship gives homage to relevant historical foundations that provide greater 
understanding for the reader, or a basis for either descriptive or novel ideas.  As 
Professor Lefkowitz noted: 
Life has come to mean so much to the scholar that he cannot 
treat it so cavalierly.  He has reverence for the past, for he 
knows all that it has given to the present.  He does not think 
that the world began but yesterday, that the contribution of art 
and science date but from the day before yesterday.  He knows 
that each age gave marvelous contributions . . . .  He is 
reverent of the past, of the wonderful truths that it has 
uncovered.  But knowing all this, he is yet confident of the 
future; that much yet remains, that the miracles of the universe 
are still waiting for revelation, that a high road leads from to-
day to tomorrow and that it always goes upward.41   
These comments underscore the importance of historical perspectives or the 
understanding of historical foundations.  Some scholars have disagreed with the 
usefulness on the premise that legal scholarship’s normative nature does not 
require a review of history because the relationship between present and past 
neither “generate[s] or even influence[s] conventional legal scholarship.”42  
Although history might not be critically instructive or necessary in all forms of 
legal scholarship, where scholarship is seeking to institute change in our laws 
or legal systems, reviewing relevant occurrences of the past that led to changes 
is instructive and inescapably a necessity.  Critical analysis through exploration 
of similarities and differences in historical management of laws, arguments, 
 
38. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § II.   
39. Id.   
40. Cramton, supra note 23, at 2–3 (citing excerpts from a talk the author gave, noting that “[t]his 
talk to a Cornell Law School alumni gathering drew freely on an excellent paper by Michael J. Graetz 
& Charles H. Whitebread II, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV. 
445 (1981),” id. at 2 n.5).   
41. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 503–04.  
42. Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 37, 40 (1998).   
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motives, and outcomes is essential.  Thoroughness becomes particularly crucial 
when producing scholarship that can be useful in the law and other disciplines.43   
V. CONCLUSION/SUGGESTIONS 
Legal scholarship is a complex process of linguistic exercise.  It is “mental 
training” that requires the ability and “the willingness to think, to think things 
through.”44  “Outstanding scholarship typically involves high risk work that is 
based on substantial research, long-term training, a wealth of previous 
experience, and the use of unconventional methods.”45  The legal profession 
and society in general “needs the open mind and the constant care and attention 
of the pedagogical expert.”46  The pedagogical experts (i.e., legal scholars) 
should therefore take responsibility professionally and personally for their 
work.  It is therefore important that scholars adhere to some ethical norms to 
ensure compliance with the social contract and promote values that are essential 
to the legal profession, such as trust, accountability, mutual respect, and 
fairness.  Without these values, ethical lapses in legal scholarship can harm the 
author,47 the credibility of academic institutions48 and the legal profession, and 
violate the social contract.  To preserve the relationship between the profession 
and the public, the adherence to the social contract is crucial.   
In order to uphold their obligations under the social contract, legal scholars 
should endeavor to create scholarship that has independent value yet is still 
connected to a larger conceptual body of work with appropriate 
 
43. Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1221–22 (1981) 
(noting that legal scholars need substantial amounts of time to develop an understanding of social 
theory that might usefully be employed in extra-doctrinal legal scholarship).   
44. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 503.   
45. Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation Of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 229 (1988).   
46. Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 505.  “[A]bove all . . . the scholar is . . . the influence of urbanity 
in life and in the community.  He must breathe the spirit of toleration, of the open mind, into the city 
of his residence; he must suggest breadth of view among his people.”  Id. at 506.   
47. Ethical lapses in published writings can negatively impact an author’s reputation.  In 
addition, discovery of such lapses can directly affect academic career growth if included in 
deliberations regarding issues of promotion or tenure of the author.  Academic career growth is a very 
complex process.  The breadth and width of the reach of legal scholarship is oftentimes immeasurable.  
Exposure of scholarship riddled with ethical concerns will have far-reaching and long-lasting harmful 
effects for the author.   
48. See Boothe-Perry, supra note 14, at 80 (“[C]onduct and behavior within the institution 
reflects not only on [law professors] as individuals, but more importantly on the status and perception 
of the institution itself”).   
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acknowledgement of cited material.49  Fragments that contribute to a greater 
collective body will provide insight and encourage dialogue that enriches the 
legal community and society at large.  Valuable scholarship will develop and 
present arguments or thoughts with an aim to improve the legal profession.  
This can only be accomplished coupling a foundation of truth with exhaustive 
research and analysis.  Whether that is done through constructive criticism or 
by provoking thought, the goal should always be to improve the legal profession 
and satisfy responsibilities under the social contract.   
As the AALS Statement of Good Practices states:  
The fact that a law professor’s income does not depend on 
serving the interests of private clients permits a law professor 
to take positions on issues about which practicing lawyers may 
be more inhibited.  With that freedom from economic pressure 
goes an enhanced obligation to pursue individual and social 
justice.50   
Legal scholars must use the privilege of academic freedom to produce unbiased 
and comprehensive scholarship that influences and instructs the law and legal 
systems.   
Bertolt Brecht once wrote that 
[n]owadays, anyone who wishes to combat lies and ignorance 
and to write the truth must overcome at least five difficulties. 
He must have the courage to write the truth when truth is 
everywhere opposed; the keenness to recognize it, although it 
is everywhere concealed; the skill to manipulate it as a weapon; 
the judgment to select those in whose hands it will be effective; 
and the cunning to spread the truth among such persons.51   
The social contract demands no less from legal scholars.   
 
 
49. Thoroughness is essential to avoid plagiarism issues.  Professor Deborah Rhode has noted 
that unintentional plagiarism can result from “sloppy research.”  See Deborah L. Rhode, The 
Professional Ethics of Professors, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 70, 72 (2006).   
50. AALS STATEMENT, supra note 10, § V.   
51. BERTOLT BRECHT, WRITING THE TRUTH: FIVE DIFFICULTIES 1 (1935), 
http://ada.evergreen.edu/~arunc/texts/theater/brecht/fiveDifficulties.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYZ9-
NBDT].   
